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Frank Hecker  
View profile
 More options Oct 25 2001, 4:07 pm
Newsgroups: netscape.public.mozilla.security
From: Frank Hecker <hec...@mozilla.org>
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 16:03:38 -0400
Local: Thurs, Oct 25 2001 4:03 pm
Subject: Handling Mozilla security bugs, draft 8 ("release candidate")

Attached is a new draft I've done for the proposal on how to handle
Mozilla security bugs, based on Mitch Stoltz's draft from 10/8 posted to
n.p.m.security (which was in turn based on my previous drafts).

The changes in this draft include:

* Clarifying that the security module owner (working with the peers and
other members of the security bug group), not the bug reporter, is
responsible for driving the process of investigating and disclosing
security bug reports. (A bug reporter would still have the power to
disclose bug reports originally submitted by them; they're just not the
primary person held responsible for getting the bug disclosed at some
point.) This change was made to address the concern that bug reporters
might forget about security bugs they reported, with bug reports then
remaining undisclosed in Bugzilla indefinitely; the security module
owner will be held responsible for making sure this doesn't happen.

* Changing the email address of the security bug group mailing list, to
security-gr...@mozilla.org.

* Changing the email address to which security bugs are reported, to
secur...@mozilla.org.

* Adding the requirement that publicly released vulnerability reports
should be sent to a moderated mailing list (and/or newsgroup) in
addition to posting them to a web page. (The list/group should be
moderated to cut down on spam and spurious posts. One can also conceive
of these reports being digitally signed using OpenPGP or S/MIME, to
minimize the likelihood someone will try to forge one, but I'll leave
those sorts of implementation details to others.)

* Making it clear that any future proposed changes to the policies on
handling Mozilla security bugs will be discussed in Mozilla-related
public forums (e.g., n.p.m.security), not just among Mozilla staff and
the members of the security bug group.

* Removing a trailing space on one line (the text of which was otherwise
unchanged).

I will be the first to admit that this policy does not necessarily
command 100 per cent unanimous approval in all its details. However IMO
it is a suitable starting point for addressing these issues, and I would
like to see us try out this policy for a while (say, for a few months)
and see how well it works in practice before trying to revise it
further. Therefore I'm declaring this a "release candidate" for the
official mozilla.org policy, and after taking final comments for the
next 24 hours or so I will propose to mozilla.org staff that this go
into effect.

Frank

--
Frank Hecker
hec...@mozilla.org

[ security-bugs-draft8.html 18K ]

Handling Mozilla Security Bugs

Version 1.0
DRAFT 8
October 25, 2001

Introduction

In order to improve the Mozilla project's approach to resolving Mozilla security vulnerabilities, mozilla.org is creating more formal arrangements for handling Mozilla security-related bugs. First, mozilla.org is appointing a security module owner charged with primary responsibility for coordinating the investigation and resolution of reported Mozilla security vulnerabilities; the security module owner will have one or more peers to assist in this task. At the same time mozilla.org is also creating a larger "Mozilla security bug group" by which Mozilla contributors and others can participate in addressing security vulnerabilities in Mozilla. This document describes how this new organizational structure will work, and how security-related Mozilla bug reports will be handled.

Note that the focus of this new structure is restricted solely to addressing actual security vulnerabilities arising from problems in Mozilla code. This work is separate from the work of developers adding new security features (cryptographically-based or otherwise) to Mozilla, although obviously many of the same people will be involved in both sets of activities.

Note also that the scheme described in this document will completely replace the traditional practice of marking security-related Mozilla bugs as "Netscape Confidential." The mozilla.org Bugzilla system is being modified to remove the ability to mark bugs as "Netscape Confidential," and to instead implement the scheme described below.

Background

Security vulnerabilities are different from other bugs, because their consequences are potentially so severe: users' private information (including financial information) could be exposed, users' data could be destroyed, and users' systems could be used as platforms for attacks on other systems. Thus people have strong feelings about how security-related bugs are handled, and in particular about the degree to which information about such bugs is publicly disclosed.

The Mozilla project is a public software development project, and thus we have an inherent bias towards openness. In particular, we understand and acknowledge the concerns of those who believe that all information about security vulnerabilities should be publicly disclosed as soon as it is known, so that users may take immediate steps to protect themselves and so that problems can get the maximum amount of developer attention and be fixed as soon as possible.

At the same time the Mozilla project receives substantial contributions of code and developer time from organizations that use (or plan to use) Mozilla code in their own product offerings. Some of these products may be used by large populations of end users, many of whom may not often upgrade or check for recent security fixes. We understand and acknowledge the concerns of those who believe that too-hasty disclosure of exploit details can provide a short-term advantage to potential attackers, who can exploit a problem before most end users become aware of its existence.

We believe that both sets of concerns are valid, and that both are worth addressing as best we can. We have attempted to create a compromise scheme for how the Mozilla project will handle reports of security vulnerabilities. We believe that it is a compromise that can be justified to those on both sides of the question regarding disclosure.

General policies

mozilla.org has adopted the following general policies for handling bug reports related to security vulnerabilities:

  • Security bug reports can be treated as special and handled differently than "normal" bugs. In particular, the mozilla.org Bugzilla system will allow bug reports related to security vulnerabilities to be marked as "Security-Sensitive," and will have special access control features specifically for use with such bug reports. However a security bug can revert back to being a normal bug (by having the "Security-Sensitive" flag removed), in which case the access control restrictions will no longer be in effect.
  • Full information about security bugs will be restricted to a known group of people, using the Bugzilla access control restrictions described above. However that group can and will be expanded as necessary and appropriate.
  • As noted above, information about security bugs can be held confidential for some period of time; there is no pre-determined limit on how long that time period might be. However this is offset by the fact that the person reporting a bug has visibility into the activities (if any) being taken to address the bug, and has the power to open the bug report for public scrutiny.

The remaining sections of the document describe in more detail how these general policies have been implemented in practice.

Organizational structure for handling security bugs

We are organizing the investigation and fixing of Mozilla security vulnerabilities similar to the way Mozilla project activities are handled in general: There will be a security module owner, a small core group of active contributors who can act as peers to the module owner, a larger group of less active participants, and other people who may become involved from time to time. As with other parts of the Mozilla project, participation in Mozilla security-related activities will be open to both independent volunteers and to employees of the various corporations and other organizations involved with Mozilla.

The Mozilla security module owner and peers

The Mozilla security module owner will be Mitch Stoltz. Mitch has been actively involved full-time in the area of Mozilla security for quite some time now, in particular as the primary developer responsible for the so-called component security features of Mozilla.

The Mozilla security module owner will have a similar level of power and responsibility as other Mozilla module owners; also as with other Mozilla module owners, mozilla.org staff will oversee the work of the security module owner and select a new security module owner should that ever be necessary for any reason.

The Mozilla security module owner will work with mozilla.org staff to select one or more people to act as peers to the security module owner in investigating and resolving security vulnerabilities; the peers will share responsibility for overseeing and coordinating any and all activities related to security bugs.

The Mozilla security bug group

The Mozilla security module owner and peers will form the core of the Mozilla security bug group, and will select a number of other people to round out the group's membership. Each and every member of the Mozilla security bug group will automatically have access to all Mozilla bugs marked "Security-Sensitive." The members of the Mozilla security bug group will be drawn primarily from the following groups:

  • security developers (i.e., those whose bugs are often singled out as security-relevant or who have security-relevant bugs assigned to them), and security QA people who are the QA contacts for those bugs;
  • "exploit hunters" with a good track record of finding significant Mozilla security vulnerabilities;
  • representatives of the various companies and groups actively distributing Mozilla-based products; and
  • super-reviewers and drivers.

(The Bugzilla administrators will technically be in the Mozilla security bug group as well, mainly because they already have visibility into all Bugzilla data hosted through mozilla.org.)

The Mozilla security bug group will have a private mailing list, security-group@mozilla.org, to which everyone in the security bug group will be subscribed. This list will act as a forum for discussing group policy and the addition of new members, as described below. In addition, Mozilla.org will maintain a second well-known address, security@mozilla.org, through which people not on the security group can submit reports of security bugs. Mail sent to this address will go to the security module owner and peers, who will be responsible for posting the information received to Bugzilla, and marking the bug as "Security-sensitive" if it is warranted given the nature and severity of the bug and the risk of potential exploits.

Other participants

Besides the permanent security bug group members described above, there are two other categories of people who may participate in security bug group activities and have access to otherwise-confidential security bug reports:

  • A person who reports a security bug will have continued access to all Bugzilla activities associated with that bug, even if the bug is marked "Security-Sensitive."
  • Any other persons may be given access to a particular security bug, by someone else (who does have access) adding them to the CC list for that bug.

Thus someone reporting a security bug in essence becomes a member of the overall group of people working to investigate and fix that particular vulnerability, and anyone else may be easily invited to assist as well if and when that makes sense.

Expanding the Mozilla security

...

read more »

[ security-bugs-draft7-draft8-diff.txt 7K ]
*** security-bugs-draft7.html   Wed Oct 24 14:03:05 2001
--- security-bugs-draft8.html   Thu Oct 25 15:35:57 2001
***************
*** 19,26 ****

  <div class=version>
  Version 1.0<br>
! DRAFT 7<br>
! October 8, 2001
  </div>

--- 19,26 ----

  <div class=version>
  Version 1.0<br>
! DRAFT 8<br>
! October 25, 2001
  </div>

***************
*** 99,105 ****
  handling bug reports related to security vulnerabilities:</p>

  <ul>
! <li>Security bug reports will be treated as special and handled
  differently than "normal" bugs. In particular, the mozilla.org
  Bugzilla system will allow bug reports related to security
  vulnerabilities to be marked as
--- 99,105 ----
  handling bug reports related to security vulnerabilities:</p>

  <ul>
! <li>Security bug reports can be treated as special and handled
  differently than "normal" bugs. In particular, the mozilla.org
  Bugzilla system will allow bug reports related to security
  vulnerabilities to be marked as
***************
*** 119,127 ****
  on how long that time period might be. However this is offset by
  the fact that the person reporting a bug has visibility into
  the activities (if any) being taken to address the bug,
! has the primary responsibility for deciding when the bug
! report should be opened for public scrutiny, and has the power to
! do so.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>The remaining sections of the document describe in more detail
--- 119,125 ----
  on how long that time period might be. However this is offset by
  the fact that the person reporting a bug has visibility into
  the activities (if any) being taken to address the bug,
! and has the power to open the bug report for public scrutiny.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>The remaining sections of the document describe in more detail
***************
*** 194,209 ****
  mozilla.org.)</p>

  <p>The Mozilla security bug group will have a private mailing list,
! security-bug-gr...@mozilla.org,
  to which everyone in the security bug group will be subscribed. This
  list will act as a forum for discussing group policy
  and the addition of new members, as described below. In addition,
  Mozilla.org will maintain a second well-known address,
! security-bug-repo...@mozilla.org, through which people not
  on the security group can submit reports of security bugs. Mail
  sent to this address will go to the security module owner and peers,
! who will be responsible for posting the information received to a
! security bug.</p>

  <h3>Other participants</h3>

--- 192,209 ----
  mozilla.org.)</p>

  <p>The Mozilla security bug group will have a private mailing list,
! security-gr...@mozilla.org,
  to which everyone in the security bug group will be subscribed. This
  list will act as a forum for discussing group policy
  and the addition of new members, as described below. In addition,
  Mozilla.org will maintain a second well-known address,
! secur...@mozilla.org, through which people not
  on the security group can submit reports of security bugs. Mail
  sent to this address will go to the security module owner and peers,
! who will be responsible for posting the information received to
! Bugzilla, and marking the bug as "Security-sensitive" if it is
! warranted given the nature and severity of the bug and the risk of
! potential exploits.</p>

  <h3>Other participants</h3>

***************
*** 322,328 ****

  <p>When a bug is put into the security bug group, the
  group members, bug reporter, and others associated with the bug
! will decide by consensus, either through comments on the bug
  or the group mailing list, whether an immediate warning
  to users is appropriate and how it should be worded. The goals
  of this warning are:</p>
--- 322,328 ----

  <p>When a bug is put into the security bug group, the
  group members, bug reporter, and others associated with the bug
! will decide by consensus, either through comments on the bug
  or the group mailing list, whether an immediate warning
  to users is appropriate and how it should be worded. The goals
  of this warning are:</p>
***************
*** 343,360 ****
  a peer, or some other person they may designate will post this
  message to the
  <a href="http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/KnownVulnerabilities.html">
! Known Vulnerabilities</a> page.
  Mozilla distributors who wish to inform
  their users of the existence of a vulnerability may repost any
  information from the Known Vulnerabilities page
  to their own websites, mailing lists, release notes, etc., but
  should not disclose any additional information about the bug.</p>

! <p>The original reporter of a security bug has the primary
! responsibility for deciding when that bug will be made public;
  disclosure is done by clearing the bug's "Security-Sensitive" flag,
  after which the bug will revert to being an ordinary bug. We believe
! that investing this power and responsibility in the bug reporter simply
  acknowledges reality:
  Nothing prevents the person reporting a security bug from
  publicizing information about the bug by posting it to channels
--- 343,364 ----
  a peer, or some other person they may designate will post this
  message to the
  <a href="http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/KnownVulnerabilities.html">
! Known Vulnerabilities</a> page
! (which will be the authoritative source for this information)
! and will also send a copy of this message to an appropriate moderated
! mailing list and/or newsgroup (e.g., netscape.public.mozilla.announce
! and/or some other newsgroup/list established specifically for this purpose).
  Mozilla distributors who wish to inform
  their users of the existence of a vulnerability may repost any
  information from the Known Vulnerabilities page
  to their own websites, mailing lists, release notes, etc., but
  should not disclose any additional information about the bug.</p>

! <p>The original reporter of a security bug may decide when that bug
! report will be made public;
  disclosure is done by clearing the bug's "Security-Sensitive" flag,
  after which the bug will revert to being an ordinary bug. We believe
! that investing this power in the bug reporter simply
  acknowledges reality:
  Nothing prevents the person reporting a security bug from
  publicizing information about the bug by posting it to channels
***************
*** 387,393 ****
  distributors can still be informed and take appropriate action.)</li>
  </ul>

! <p>If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information
  about a security bug, the security bug group will discuss the issue via
  its mailing list and attempt to reach consensus. If
  necessary mozilla.org staff will serve as the "court of last
--- 391,401 ----
  distributors can still be informed and take appropriate action.)</li>
  </ul>

! <p>The security module owner will be the primary person responsible for
! ensuring that security bug reports are investigated and publicly
! disclosed in a timely manner, and that such bug reports do not remain
! in the Bugzilla database uninvestigated and/or undisclosed.
! If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information
  about a security bug, the security bug group will discuss the issue via
  its mailing list and attempt to reach consensus. If
  necessary mozilla.org staff will serve as the "court of last
***************
*** 413,420 ****

  <p>As with other Mozilla project issues, mozilla.org staff will have
  the final authority to make changes to this policy, and will do so only
! after consulting with the various parties involved, in order to ensure
! that all views are taken into account.</p>

  </body>
  </html>
--- 421,429 ----

  <p>As with other Mozilla project issues, mozilla.org staff will have
  the final authority to make changes to this policy, and will do so only
! after consulting with the various parties involved and with the public
! Mozilla community, in order to ensure that all views are taken into
! account.</p>

  </body>
  </html>


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Ben Bucksch  
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 More options Oct 26 2001, 3:08 am
Newsgroups: netscape.public.mozilla.security
From: ben.bucksch.n...@beonex.com (Ben Bucksch)
Date: 26 Oct 2001 06:56:42 GMT
Local: Fri, Oct 26 2001 2:56 am
Subject: Re: Handling Mozilla security bugs, draft 8 ("release candidate")

Frank Hecker wrote:
> The changes in this draft include:

The changes you made look fine. More important are the changes you did
*not* make.

All: I discussed a bit more with each of Mitch and Frank privately some
time ago. Unfortunately, both discussions stopped at some point. I hope,
they don't disagree with me discussing the 2 most important points here.

  1. Vendor warnings wording/content

Frank suggested the following wording wrt. vulnerability warnings:

"Mozilla distributors who wish to inform their users of the existence of
a vulnerability may redistribute these [official] security warnings
verbatim or use them as a basis for warnings to their own users. However
Mozilla distributors and others should not publish information that
could be used to create exploits for the bug."

That (which is different from the wording in the latest draft) would
work for me, with one exception discussed next.

  2. No warning at all

Mitch told me that he in fact sees cases where a severe exploit would
not be warned about at all. He mentioned the case, where the only
workaround would be to stop using the product.
I do think that it is important to warn users even in those cases. If
Netscape doesn't want to issue a warning to its users, that's Netscape's
choice, but I would surely want to warn Beonex users. Under the current
policy, I would not be allowed to.

Even if the strategy Mitch proposed might sound reasonable /from a
certain point of view/, it is very problematic in practice. When exactly
is there "no workaround"? For example,

    * does disabling JavaScript count as workaround? I would surely say
      yes, and it would probably be the most common workaround, but
      somebody could argue that many websites are not usable at all
      without JavaScript. If we follow that argumentation, we wouldn't
      warn about the majority of severe bugs.
    * If there is a buffer overflow bug in the image lib, does it count
      as workaround to disable images?
    * If there is a overflow in HTTP, HTML or (mail-)MIME code, does it
      count as workaround to use a filtering proxy? Many companies force
      the use of a proxy anyway and could, maybe even without too much
      hassle, install a proxy [rule], which protects against the
      exploit. So, I would say that there is a workaround. Netscape OTOH
      might argue that most of its users are individuals which are
      connected directly to the internet and that it is (in fact)
      unreasonable to ask them to install a proxy.

I stick to my point that it is necessary to warn users about every
severe bug. Every policy which disallows that does IMO put users
unnecessarily at risk.


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